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Why Start-ups?
Joseph Bankman* and Ronald J. Gilson**
The prototypical start-up involves an employee leaving her job with an
idea and selling a portion of that idea to a venture capitalist. In many respects,
however, the idea should be worth more to the former employer. The former
employer can be expected to have better information concerning the employee-
entrepreneur and the technology, have opportunities to capture economies of
scale and scope not available to a venture capital-backed start-up, and will re-
ceive more favorable tax treatment than the start-up should the innovation fail.
In connection with an auction of the idea, the former employer should have
both a more accurate estimate of its value and receive an element of private
value not available to the venture capitalist. In turn, this should give rise to a
powerful winner's curse: each time a venture capitalist wins the auction, it will
have paid more than a party that has better information and receives an ele-
ment of private value. The puzzle, then, is why do we ever observe start-ups?
Professors Joseph Bankman and Ronald J. Gilson suggest three interrelated
explanations. First, the venture capitalist may have superior information with
respect to some subset of employee innovations. Second, employer bids on em-
ployee innovation can create an incentive for employees to establish internal
property rights in their research efforts that may reduce the future output of the
employer's research and development efforts. Finally, employees are not ho-
mogenous. The attractiveness of venture capitalfinancing depends critically on
employee personal characteristics, such as risk aversion. The employer sets the
internal payoff to discovery-its bid-to equalize the marginal benefit of re-
taining employees who might otherwise leave to the marginal cost of establish-
ing unfavorable incentives for future research and development for those em-
ployees who do not find venture capital financing a close substitute for contin-
ued employment. In some cases, this calculus might lead to a "no bid" policy.
In virtually all cases, the pay-off will be set too loll to retain all employees, and
start-ups ensue.
Communities are defined by their mythology. In Silicon Valley, the de-
fining myth takes as its stage David Packard's or Steve Jobs' garage. Palo
Alto's Roland is the engineer who, with nothing but an idea and strength of
character, leaves his job with an established company, starts a firm that be-
* Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University.
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comes an industry leader, and in the process becomes fabulously wealthy. In
this community, the myth is taken seriously. Over and over again, people set
out on the path of heroes: They leave their comfortable, secure jobs, and
start from scratch.1 In this article, we seek to better understand the economic
foundation for the high-tech start-up phenomenon.
The task is interesting because, as a matter of culture, high-tech entre-
preneurs are the cowboys of our age. In the United States, as Willie Nelson
has told us, our heroes have always been cowboys.2 More to the point of our
inquiry here, the presence of start-ups poses an intriguing puzzle as a matter
of industrial organization. Each time an engineer leaves her established em-
ployer and organizes a venture capital-backed start-up, an alternative was
also available: The employer could have paid the engineer to stay with the
company and develop the new idea there. The puzzle arises because, on a
first run-through, it is easy to show that the employer's proposal should be
successful every time. Characterizing the initial transaction as an auction by
the engineer of a share in her intellectual property, the idea should be worth
more to the employer than to a venture capitalist who would fund the start-
up. Accordingly, the employer should always win the auction. The puzzle,
then, is how do venture capitalists ever win the auction? Why do we ever
observe start-ups? Our analysis suggests that venture capitalists win, and we
observe start-ups at all, at least in part because employers limit the circum-
stances in which they bid.
In Part I, we motivate the analysis by demonstrating the employer's bid-
ding advantage. In addition to information and scope economies available to
the employer but not a start-up, we stress that the asymmetrical character of
the corporate income tax favors an established profitable company (the em-
ployer) over a start-up as a vehicle for developing the employee's innova-
tion. In Part II, we canvas a range of explanations for why the employer
might decline to bid for ideas that are worth more to it than to the next high-
est bidder. We note that, for a certain subgroup of innovations, the em-
ployer's bidding advantage is offset by certain skills possessed not by it but
by venture capitalists. In addition, a practice of establishing large rewards to
those employees who develop an idea that could be sold to a venture capital-
1. For the now-standard account of the sociology of the Silicon Valley high technology in-
dustrial district, see generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994). She reports, for example, that Hewlett-
Packard "executives alone were responsible for starting more than eighteen firms between 1974 and
1984, including notable successes such as Rolm, Tandem, and Pyramid Technology." Id. at 116.
Amar Bhide provides some empirical support for the prevalence of the phenomenon, reporting that
71% of the founders of 100 of the 1989 Inc. Magazine's 500 fastest-growing companies had
"[r]eplicated or modified an idea encountered through previous employmenL" Amar Bhide, How
Entrepreneurs Craft Strategies that Work, 72 HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 150, 151.
2. See WILLIE NELSON, My Heroes Have Always Been Cowboys, on SOUNDTRACK: THE
ELECTRIC HORSEMAN (1979); see also SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 38 (reporting that "[t]he culture
of the Valley accorded the highest regard to those who started firms").
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ist may have dramatic effects on the employer's overall research and devel-
opment effort. In order for the employee to have a property right that can be
sold externally, and thereby trigger a bid by the employer, the employee
must have established an internal property right. The behavior resulting
from the employees' incentive to create internal property rights gives rise to
costs for an employer that participates in the venture capital auction. In Part
II, we note that the attractiveness of venture capital funding to an employee
depends critically on certain employee characteristics, such as risk aversion,
or the desire to be one's own boss. For employees with these characteristics,
venture capital financing and employment with an established firm are not
close substitutes. Employers have only a rough idea of the dispersion of
these characteristics among employees. Employers will adopt a bidding
strategy that balances overpaying to retain employees who do not find ven-
ture financing a close substitute for continued employment, and establishing
unfavorable research and development incentives for this class of employees,
against the benefits of retaining employees who find venture capital funding
more attractive.
I. THE EMPLOYER'S ADVANTAGE: WHY WE SHOULD NOT OBSERVE
START-UPS
To set up the puzzle, assume that we have a risk-neutral, established em-
ployer and a group of risk-averse engineers. Each of the engineers is com-
petent at pursuing the employer's ongoing business-normal science-and
each has a positive probability of developing an innovation that would give
rise to a new business. Neither the engineers nor the employer can identify
ex ante which of the engineers actually will develop the innovation.3 The
obvious risk-sharing arrangement is for the employer to hire all the engi-
3. If each engineer accurately knew her own probability of making a discovery, then the em-
ployer could devise alternative contracts that would induce engineer self-selection-that is, each
engineer's hidden information concerning her own abilities would be credibly revealed by her
choice of contract. The assumption that the engineers cannot accurately assess their own ability is
supported by survey evidence showing that engineers systematically over value their performance, a
phenomenon we will call the "Lake Wobegon effect." See GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON
DAYS (1985) (noting that all of the children in the town of Lake Wobegon were better than aver-
age). Todd Zenger reports that, of a random sample of Silicon Valley engineers, more than one-
third rated their performance among the top 5% of all engineers, and nearly 90% placed their per-
formance in the top quartile. See TODD R. ZENGER, COMPENSATING FOR INNOVATION: Do SMALL
FIRMS OFFER HIGH-POWERED INCENTIVES THAT LURE TALENT AND MOTIVATE EFFORT? (John M.
Olin School of Business Working Paper No. 96-24, 1996). Less than 1% of the sample believed
their performance was below average. See id. Such cognitive misassessment makes a successful
separating contract difficult to imagine. For a more general treatment of managerial overconfidence
in assessing risk, see Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cog-
nitive Perspective on Risk Taking, in FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN STRATEGY 71 (Richard P. Rumelt,
Dan E. Schendel & David J. Teece eds., 1994) (arguing that "decision makers are excessively prone




neers, pay each the mean expected value of the group, and receive in return
the engineers' contribution to the employer's ongoing business and all dis-
coveries made by any of them.
Of course, once the uncertainty is eliminated-when the passage of time
reveals which engineers have won the innovation lottery-the engineers'
attraction to ex ante risk sharing gives way to an incentive for ex post op-
portunism. The winning engineer wants to keep the discovery for herself.
Thus, the risk-sharing arrangement must have some characteristics that pro-
tect it from the corrosive effect of learning which engineer wins. And it
should be apparent that, whatever the arrangement, it is not perfect. There
must be a problem in prospectively transferring ownership of the engineers'
discoveries to the employer. If the property rights could be fully specified
and transferred ex ante, we would not observe start-ups. Thus, the puzzle is
premised on a contracting failure.4
However, contracting failure alone is insufficient to account for the ex-
istence of start-ups. Even if the employee retains some property right in her
discovery, commercializing the idea requires starting a business. In return
for some portion of the future earnings from the innovation, other parties still
must put up the factors of production the employee lacks: (1) capital; and (2)
managerial, manufacturing, and marketing expertise. A conventional solu-
tion to this problem is venture capital financing. A venture capital fund con-
tributes capital to the start-up as well as noncapital contributions such as
management consulting, monitoring, and reputation, in return for an owner-
ship stake in the start-up.5 But suppose we recharacterize the venture capital
4. This assessment seems especially plausible with respect to Silicon Valley. California
Business and Professions Code § 16600 makes post-employment covenants not to compete unen-
forceable. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997). Because a post-employment cove-
nant is likely the most effective way to assure transfer from employee to employer of the property
right in future discoveries, its unavailability is sufficient to explain the incomplete specification of
property rights. See RONALD J. GILSON, THE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS: SILICON VALLEY, ROUTE 128, AND COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 40-42
(Olin Program on Law and Economics, Stanford Law School, 1998). The welfare consequences of
this incompleteness are ambiguous. While traditional property rights analysis suggests that incom-
pleteness gives rise to inefficiently reduced incentives to invest in innovation, Gilson suggests that
the incompleteness gives rise to an externality, see id. at 43 (describing how CAL BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 16600 solves a collective action problem in Silicon Valley), that supports the maintenance
of an industrial district of the sort described by Saxenian. See SAXENIAN, supra note I, at 116
(describing how Silicon Valley firms allow free movement of employees and concomitant informa-
tion sharing).
5. For accounts of the venture capital fund/portfolio company relationship, see generally Ber-
nard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks
Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998) (explaining and comparing the relationship in
the United States, Germany, and Japan); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1996) (focusing on
relationships "between investors and venture capitalists and between venture capital firms and the
ventures in which they invest"); and William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Ven-
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process as an auction. The engineer leaving her position with the employer
is selling off a portion of her innovation to the highest bidder. When all else
is equal, the employer has advantages-tax, information, and scope-that
should result in it consistently winning the auction.
A. The Employer's Tax Advantage
Under current law, the tax treatment of corporate investment depends on
the tax history of the organization making that investment. An investment
made by a company with sources of past or present income is subject to a
symmetrical tax regime: The expenses of the investment are deductible and
produce tax savings, while the gains from investment are subject to tax. An
investment carried out by a start-up, in contrast, is subject to an asymmetrical
tax regime: Gains are fully taxed, but losses may be deducted only against
future income. As discussed in more detail below, this difference in tax re-
gime operates in the circumstance of interest here to provide a substantial
subsidy for an employer's efforts to develop an employee's innovation inter-
nally.6
Under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 172, a start-up may deduct ex-
penses only against income-expenses in excess of current income (a net
operating loss) may generally be carried forward for fifteen years and de-
ducted against future income.7 In contrast, a company with sources of past
or present income from other activities-we will call it an "established com-
pany"-may deduct expenses of the start-up activity that exceed start-up ac-
tivity income as they are incurred: The expenses of the start-up activity are
set off against the income from other activities. The significance of the di-
vergent tax treatment of innovation expenses incurred by established compa-
nies on the one hand, and start-ups on the other, depends on the timing for
tax purposes of expenses and income. For a number of reasons, the conse-
quences of this divergent tax treatment are likely to be particularly important
for start-ups.
First, a significant number of start-up companies never earn profits.' For
these companies, the limitation on deductibility amounts to a permanent loss
lure-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473 (1990) (analyzing 140 venture fund partnership
agreements).
6. See generally Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1737 (1994) (providing a more complete description of the tax treatment of traditional start-up
ventures and that of alternative structures).
7. See I.R.C. § 172 (West Supp. 1998).
S. Empirical evidence indicates that one-third of venture capital investments result in losses.
See Christopher B. Barry, New Directions in Research on Venture Capital Finance, 23 J. FIN.
MGMT. ASS'N, Autumn 1994, at 3; Sahlman, supra note 5, at 483-84. According to one study, 16%
of venture capital-backed companies liquidate or go bankrupt. See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal In-
vestment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461, 1472-73 (1995).
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of the tax benefit. For more successful start-ups that ultimately do earn
profits, the combination of staged financing,9 often involving new investors
at each round, 10 and the exercise of employee stock options, likely will result
in an identifiable group of five percent shareholders increasing their owner-
ship interests by at least fifty percentage points within a three-year period.
This triggers a change of ownership under I.R.C. § 382 which, in turn,
sharply restricts the value of the net operating loss. Even companies that
reach profitability within the carry forward period and escape the change of
ownership limitation still require many years before generating sufficient
taxable incomes to take full advantage of early losses. Thus, the tax benefit
of the eventual deduction is limited by the loss of value inherent in deferral. 2
For new ventures carried out by established companies the tax picture is
quite different. Such companies face no special limitations on otherwise de-
ductible expenses, and the availability of tax credits and deductions for re-
search and development ensures that most expenses of internally developing
an innovation can be immediately offset against income from other activities.
Expressed in terms of net present value, the effect of the tax differential is
quite stark. Consider, for example, an investment that costs $100 in year one
and has the following probability distribution of returns: a 40 percent chance
of returning nothing; a 40 percent chance of returning $100 in year ten; and a
10 percent chance of returning $700 in years six through twelve. At a dis-
count rate of 15 percent (quite conservative in light of the 40 to 60 percent
rate said to be applied by venture capitalists), 3 the investment has a net pres-
ent value of approximately $141.
Now assume that the combined state and federal tax rate is 40 percent;
that an established company is able to deduct the investment ratably over
three years; and that the company is able to gross up the investment by the
9. Venture capital financing is typically staged with initial funding being significantly less
than necessary to carry out the start-up's business plan. If the start-up performs well in the first
stage, additional stages of financing occur. See Gompers, supra note 8, at 1474 (reporting that the
average venture capital portfolio company in his sample had 2.7 rounds of financing).
10. See Joshua Lemer, The Syndication of Venture Capital Investments, 23 J. FIN. MGMT.
ASS'N, Autumn 1994, at 16, 19-20.
11. Where a change in ownership occurs, the start-up may use its past losses to offset current
income in any carry forward year only to the extent of the value of the firm at the time of the
change in ownership multiplied by the long-term tax exempt interest rate. This operates to signifi-
cantly reduce the value of the carry forward. See I.R.C. § 382 (West Supp. 1998); Robert L. Parker,
The Innocent Civilians in the War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start-Up
Companies, 9 VA. TAX REV. 625, 639-40 (1990).
12. The tax history of Sierra Semiconductor is typical. The company began operations in
1984 and since that time it has grown dramatically. However, as late as 1991, the company had not
yet received the tax benefit of all the losses incurred in its early years. See SIERRA
SEMICONDUCTOR CORP., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 16, 26 (1992) (noting federal net operating loss
carry forwards of about $30 million).
13. See Sahlman, supra note 5, at 511-12 (noting that venture capital discount rates usually
range from 40% to 60%).
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present value of the tax savings. The investment now shows an after-tax pre-
sent value of approximately $135. The relatively small reduction in present
value as a result of the 40 percent tax reflects that the value of deducting the
venture's losses in the first few years offsets most of the future tax on the
later occurring venture income. In contrast, a start-up loses the entire deduc-
tion on the investments that never generate profit, and loses most of the pres-
ent value of the deduction for break-even and successful investments. As a
result, the after-tax net present value of the investment to the start-up is only
$95-$5 less than its cost, and $40 less than the value of the same invest-
ment to an established company.14
Our analysis thus far has focused only on the corporate tax. A more
complete analysis would also include the tax paid by shareholders of start-
ups on the proceeds from the sale of their stock.15 In general, taking the
shareholder-level tax into account would lessen the start-up's disadvantage.
For unsuccessful start-ups, the inability to deduct expenses would exacerbate
losses on the corporate level and lead to greater losses on the shareholder
level; for successful start-ups, the deferral of deduction at the corporate level
would reduce gains at the shareholder level. In either event, the result would
be a reduction in shareholder-level tax. Tax savings at the shareholder level,
however, would be of second-order magnitude. At best, given a 40 percent
combined state and federal tax rate, shareholders would recoup only 40 per-
cent of the tax disadvantage experienced by the corporate start-up. In all
cases, this partial recoupment of the tax disadvantage would require disposal
of the underlying stock. For unsuccessful investments, such recoupment
would be hampered by I.R.C. limitations on deduction of capital losses. 16
B. The Employer's Informational Advantage
While the employer's tax advantage, amounting to a government subsidy
available for the most part only to new ventures carried out by an established
14. The impact of the differential tax treatment of established companies and start-ups can
also be expressed in terms of the cost of capital. Assuming that the tax rate from the text example
applies (40%), that expenses incurred in the first year of a new venture can be deducted by an es-
tablished firm ratably over the first three years, and that the value of certain tax deduction is dis-
counted at an annual rate of 6%, then the present value of the cost of a S 1 investment to an estab-
lished firm is approximately $0.64. The start-up can deduct the cost of the investment only against
future income. It is reasonable to assume that only half of start-ups will ever show sufficient in-
come to take advantage of their deductions, and that for tax purposes, even successful start-ups will
take a decade to generate sufficient income to offset the investment. Since the value of the deduc-
tion depends on the realization of income, it is appropriately discounted at a rate that reflects the
riskiness of the investment. Using the same 15% rate as in the text example, the expected present
value of the deduction is less than $0.06. The after-tax cost of the $ investment to the start-up is
thus S.97-roughly 50% more than the $0.64 cost of the venture to the established company.
15. See Bankman, supra note 6, at 1746 (providing a more detailed discussion of shareholder
level income tax).
16. I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212 (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
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company, appears to be of a magnitude sufficient to assure an employer's
success in the auction of an employee's innovation, it is not the employer's
only advantage. In two important respects, the employer also has an infor-
mational advantage over venture capitalists in assessing the value of the em-
ployee's innovation.
The first advantage involves information concerning the employee him-
self. It is commonplace that venture capital investors place enormous em-
phasis on the personal characteristics of the individual in whose innovation
they invest. This is hardly surprising. Because of the uncertainty associated
with the venture's success, and because the venture's value depends on in-
vestment in future growth options that, tautologically, are highly dependent
on future managerial decisions, the marginal value of a "better" entrepreneur
is considerable. Unlike established companies where most income derives
from existing businesses whose value is less sensitive to future decisions, a
new venture's business is almost entirely dependent on the entrepreneur's
judgment. Thus, the entrepreneur's talents, independent of the character of
the innovation, influence a much larger percentage of the venture's value
than in a more mature businesses.
Because of the importance of the entrepreneur's character, assessment of
the entrepreneur is critical to the venture capitalist's valuation of the innova-
tion on which he will bid. And because of the limited opportunity for the
venture capitalist to make a direct assessment, self-selection plays an impor-
tant role in the venture capitalist's response to the hidden information prob-
lem. From this perspective, the high-powered incentives associated with the
entrepreneur's arrangement with the venture capitalist-low salary, stock-
based compensation that is subject to vesting requirements, the venture
capitalist's power to replace the entrepreneur, and the provision of financing
in stages17-also operate as a separating contract, serving to identify those
entrepreneurs who have sufficient confidence in their skills to subject them-
selves to the highly incentivized environment of early-stage venture capital
financing.
But however clever the incentive arrangements, their separating proper-
ties remain an imperfect substitute for direct observation of the employee's
characteristics. While the employer can seek to duplicate the venture capi-
talist's incentive structure, the venture capitalist cannot duplicate the em-
ployer's direct experience with the employee. This difference should be of
special importance here because of the inherent limitations on the operation
of a separating contract in the start-up setting. Using contractual terms to
generate a separating equilibrium requires that those who are offered the
17. The structure of the entrepreneur's incentives in a standard venture capital transaction is
described by Black and Gilson. See Black & Gilson, supra note 5, at 259; see also Sahlman, supra
note 5, at 506-14; Gompers, supra note 8, at 1461.
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contract know their type. Survey evidence suggests that engineers in high-
tech companies systematically overestimate the quality of their skills and
performance: one-third rate their performance in the top five percent; ninety
percent place themselves in the top quartile; and less than one percent rate
their performance below average.18 If entrepreneur-engineers share this
characteristic with engineers generally, then the separating contract will fail
to distinguish between engineers whose positive self-assessment is accurate,
and those who view themselves too favorably. So long as the problem is
self-serving self-assessment rather than adverse selection, further increasing
the power of incentives will not improve the result. Increased incentives will
generate increased risk-bearing costs and, under the incentive intensity prin-
ciple, greater expenditures on monitoring, 19 but in the absence of more accu-
rate self-assessment, no improvement in separation. The employer's direct
observation over time of the employee's characteristics should allow the em-
ployer to make a more accurate assessment of the employee's skills than will
the separating properties of the incentive contract alone and, hence, allow the
employer to make a more accurate assessment of the value of the entrepre-
neur's managerial potential.
The employer's second informational advantage concerns the innovation
itself. For this purpose, it is reasonable to assume that the innovation grows
out of the employee's experience with the employer's business.20 Bidding
for a portion of the employee's innovation requires valuing the innovation.
Here the employer should have an informational advantage that results from
its experience with precisely the technology and market out of which the in-
novation grows. To be sure, this advantage can be more easily offset by
venture capitalists than can the information asymmetry favoring the em-
ployer with respect to assessing the employee's personal characteristics. Due
diligence investigations and venture capitalist specialization by industry
should largely limit the employer's absolute valuation advantage to circum-
stances that involve firm- as opposed to industry-specific information.
Nonetheless, the cost of gaining industry-specific information to the venture
capitalist is sunk to the employer. The employer's marginal advantage with
respect to industry-specific information, together with the benefit of firm-
specific information concerning the innovation's value, provides a measure
of the employer's overall information advantage in valuing the employee's
innovation.
IS. See note 3 supra.
19. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT
221-22 (1992).
20. See note I supra.
January 1999]
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C. The Employer's Scope Advantage
Analytically, the employer's firm-specific information concerning the
value of the employee's innovation shades into advantages of scope econo-
mies. To the extent that the innovation builds on the employer's existing
technology, it is quite likely that the employer can achieve economies of
scope in connection with the innovation's commercialization, manufacturing,
and marketing. Compared to starting from scratch, complementarities in
manufacturing techniques between those required to produce the innovation
and those required to produce the employer's existing products may reduce
the cost of commercializing, and ultimately producing, the innovation com-
pared to a stand-alone venture. Similarly, the closer the relation between the
employer's existing technology and the innovation, the more likely that there
will be an overlap between the company's existing customer base and poten-
tial customers for the innovation. Thus, the potential for scope economies
gives the employer a cost advantage, and therefore a bidding advantage,
compared to a venture capital-backed start-up that must undertake commer-
cialization, manufacturing, and marketing from scratch.
D. The Outcome of the Auction
We can now return to the hypothetical auction between the employer and
a venture capitalist for an interest in the employee's innovation. The advan-
tages enjoyed by the employer should allow it to be the highest bidder in
every auction. First, the employer begins with a significant tax subsidy: In
expected value terms, the riskier the innovation, the more valuable the em-
ployer's ability to immediately deduct losses associated with the innova-
tion.21 Second, the employer's informational advantages with respect to both
the employee and the innovation give it an advantage in pricing the innova-
tion. Finally, the potential economies of scope available to the employer in
taking the innovation to market transform the structure of the auction to the
employer's advantage. While the innovation has largely common value with
respect to a venture capitalist, it has additional private value for the em-
ployer.
Thus, a venture capitalist bidding against an employer for a former em-
ployee's innovation should anticipate a serious winner's curse. Each time
the venture capitalist is the highest bidder, it must realize that it has just out-
bid a party who receives a government subsidy, has better information con-
cerning the innovation's value, and for whom the innovation has private
value as well as common value. Because the venture capitalist can anticipate
21. To see this, think of the employer holding an option that allows it the right to put 40% of
the losses to the government. From option pricing, We know that the value of an option increases
with increases in the riskiness (variance) of the value of the underlying asset.
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this analysis, it should never bid. Accordingly, we should not observe auc-
tions, and we should not observe start-ups. Employers would develop the
employee's innovation in a structure designed to capture the incentive bene-
fits of start-up organizations.
There is at least anecdotal evidence in support of this analysis. Thermo
Electron appears to exemplify the employer who never loses an auction of an
employee's innovation to a venture capitalist. The company consists of a
holding company and eleven publicly traded subsidiaries in which the hold-
ing company or a first-tier controlled subsidiary (with public ownership)
owns a majority of the outstanding stock.22 These subsidiaries are created
when an employee comes up with a new idea for a business. At that time,
the employee is given an entrepreneur's equity stake in the venture. If the
subsidiary is successful, it is ultimately taken public with the holding com-
pany retaining a majority interest. Indeed, the company has been called a
"publicly traded venture capital group... ?"3 For our purposes, the critical
point is that Thermo Electron wins the auctions for its employees' innova-
tions. Consistent with our analysis thus far, the company represents that it
has never lost an employee innovation to a venture capital-funded start-up.24
Because Thermo Electron's winning "bid" for employee innovations is em-
bedded in its internal incentive structure, the auction never occurs.
II. WHY START-UPS? EXPLANATIONS FOR WHY THE EMPLOYER
DOES NOT BID
Having demonstrated that elephants can't fly, what accounts for Dumbo?
The fact is that early stage venture capital-backed start-ups founded by em-
ployees leaving an established company are a familiar part of the high tech-
nology landscape. Indeed, annoyance at the difficulty of keeping employees
from defecting with their innovations in response to the blandishments of
venture capitalists has led the chairmen of Intel Corporation and Applied
Micro Devices to refer to venture capitalists as "vulture" capitalists, 25 led
Andrew Grove, the president of Intel, to call them the "financial equivalent
of ambulance chasers," 26 and led some scholars to argue that the phenome-
22. See Jeffrey W. Allen, Capital Markets and Corporate Structure: The Equity Carve-Outs
of Thermo Electron, 4S J. FIN. ECON. 99, 101 (1998). The company also owns nonpublic subsidi-
aries. See id.
23. John R. Wilke, hInovative Ways: Thermo Electron Uses an Unusual Strategy to Create
Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1993, at Al. For a chart of the company's structure, see Allen,
supra note 22, at 104.
24. According to founder George Hatsopoulos, "[n]o developer or entrepreneur has ever left
Thermo Electron." Norm Alster, Making the Kids Stand on Their Own, FORIiES, Oct. 9, 1995, at
49, 54.





non is a barrier to United States competitiveness with Japan.27 In this Part,
we consider what factors offset employers' sizable tax and other advantages.
The existing literature has discussed related problems, although largely
in the context of explaining more generally the perceived advantage of small
firms in pursuing innovation, rather than our more focused concern here on
employees and start-ups: the employer's ability to win an auction for the
right to purchase equity in an employee's innovation. For example, Anton
and Yao analyze the adverse selection problems confronting an employer
seeking to contract with an employee for an innovation, where the absence of
property rights exposes the employee to a risk of expropriation on revelation
of the innovation to the employer. Under the limiting assumptions of their
model, Anton and Yao show that these barriers to contracting will sometimes
lead the employee to organize a start-up even when joint employer/employee
profits would have been greater if the employer pursued the innovation.28
Anand and Galetovic also examine the impact of imperfectly specified prop-
erty rights, extending the analysis to consider the problem in the context of
multiple rounds of financing for development and commercialization. 29 Fi-
nally, Hellmann focuses on the barriers to established companies, as opposed
to venture capitalists, to providing financing to entrepreneurial companies. 30
In Hellmann's model, pursuit of innovation within established companies
faces political challenges from employees with a stake in current practices. 31
Problems with an established company may be informational, as well as
political. Earlier we noted that the established company has greater knowl-
edge of the entrepreneur and the product. Henderson and Clark point out
that the established company may be hamstrung by routinized ways of
thinking that are ill-suited to new products.32 A related possibility is that
27. See id. (citing Charles Ferguson as an academic who has accused venture capital-backed
start-ups of hurting America's ability to compete with Japan). See generally RICHARD FLORIDA &
MARTIN KENNEY, THE BREAKTHROUGH ILLUSION: CORPORATE AMERICA'S FAILURE TO MOVE
FROM INNOVATION TO MASS PRODUCTION (1990) (presenting academic articles dealing with how
firms make strategic decisions affecting their competitiveness).
28. See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects, I 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 362, 362 (1995). Steven N. Wiggins presents a related model in which the difficulty
of enforcing the employer's promise of compensation to the employee if the innovation is success-
ful leads to a start-up venture. See Steven N. Wiggins, Entrepreneurial Enterprises, Endogenous
Ownership, and the Limits to Firm Size, 33 EcON. INQ. 54, 58-63 (1995).
29. See Bharat N. Anand & Alexander Galetovic, Weak Property Rights and Hold-up in R&D
10-20 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
30. See THOMAS HELLMANN, A THEORY OF CORPORATE VENTURE INVESTING 9-26 (Stan-
ford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1452, 1997).
31. See id. at 5-9.
32. See Rebecca M. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfigura-
tion of Existing Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9,
10-13 (1990) (defining architectural innovation and noting the difficulty of pursuing it in an estab-
lished firm). Where the informational advantage involves the employer's existing technology, and
the innovation, while growing out of that technology, requires a different skill set to implement, the
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venture capitalists may have greater expertise in marketing and developing
new products. These information-related factors may explain a consistent
story of innovation given by employees who in fact become entrepreneurs:
that their decision to leave was triggered in part by the decision of their for-
mer employer to drop a promising product because it did not fit within the
employer's focus and expertise.
A final explanation for the ability of venture capitalists to outbid estab-
lished companies for innovation revolves around the difficulty of setting the
proper incentives within an established employer. Large and small firms
have different capacities for providing employees incentives to discover an
innovation. Here, existing literature stresses three themes.
First, Milgrom and Roberts stress the problem of "influence activities"
by employees.33 Where a decisionmaker requires information from employ-
ees to make a decision which has consequences for the employee, and where
the employees' allocation of their efforts cannot be observed, the employee
will have an incentive to expend effort to influence the employer's decision
rather than in productive activity. Such influence activities result in in-
creased costs to the employer both from the employee's decreased produc-
tivity and from the self-serving character (decreased accuracy) of the infor-
mation the employee provides to the decisionmaker, with a resulting de-
crease in the quality of the decision.
Second, Holmstrom emphasizes differential measurement and monitor-
ing costs. Where measuring the employee's performance in innovative ac-
tivity is more difficult than measuring her performance in more routine ac-
tivities, restricting the range of the employee's activities is desirable.34
When coupled with increased monitoring costs, both factors favor carrying
out innovative activity in smaller organizations.
A final theme focuses on the perception of unfairness resulting from
wide pay disparities within a single organization. Given employees' marked
tendency to overestimate their own performance, providing intense incen-
tives achievable by only some employees can result in a perception of un-
fairness by other employees. This results in decreased productivity by the
employer actually may be at a disadvantage to a start-up. If the innovation requires the employer to
unlearn precisely the information and routines that made it a success with the existing technology, a
form of innovation styled "architectural," the venture capitalist may have an advantage in valuing
the new technology. See id. at IS.
33. See generally Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, An Economic Approach to Influence Activi-
ties in Organizations, 94 Am. J. Soc. S154 (1988) (explaining "influence activities," their negative
effects on firms, and possible response strategies).
34. See Bengt Holmstrom, Agency Costs and Innovation, 12 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 305,
312 (1989). See generally Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses:
Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG., Special Issue 1991, at




demoralized workers.35 Lazear makes a similar argument, but stresses the
incentive for employees who compete for a prize to sabotage each other's
efforts.36 Both accounts credit the unintended consequences or perverse in-
centives of relative incentive pay as explaining the broad incidence of wage
compression-the lack of strong pay-for-performance incentives-in U.S.
industry. Smaller firms, where there is less heterogeneity among employees,
where employees are better able to observe each other's performance, and
where there is less need to differentiate among employees in devising incen-
tives, are said to have lower costs of providing strong performance incen-
tives.37 This facility at providing the intense incentives necessary to motivate
innovation thus helps explain why small firms outperform large firms in this
area.
Our analysis here extends the internal incentive literature in explaining
the employee-founded, venture capital-backed start-up phenomenon despite
the employer's tax, information, and scope advantages in the auction of an
employee's innovation. In particular, we stress the cost of a particular kind
of employee influence activity that would result from the expectation of the
employer's participation in the auction of the employee's innovation, one
that goes directly to the character of the research and development process.
The employer's decision to participate in the venture capital auction
serves, in effect, to create a powerful internal incentive: employees who dis-
cover an innovation of a character significant enough to generate outside
venture capital offers are rewarded with an internal entrepreneurial payoff
that, because of the employer's multiple advantages, will be set to marginally
exceed the expected venture capital offer. The barrier to employer adoption
of this arrangement-that is, why we nonetheless observe start-ups in the
face of employer bidding advantages-is not fully captured by the themes in
the existing literature. First, the difficulty of measurement costs should be
less significant in this setting because the incentive arrangement pays off on
an observable output: an innovation that can attract outside funding. Sec-
ond, concerns over the costs of perceived unfairness should be tempered for
the same reason. Since the payoff is on an observable output, it also should
be observable to other employees: the requirement of an externally validated
innovation acts as a barrier to widespread misperception of abilities. Indeed,
a very high payoff to an infrequent but observable outcome is consistent with
the wage compression reported by Lazear-the bulk of employees are
lumped into a few broad categories where most of the compensation variance
35. See Todd R. Zenger, Explaining Organizational Diseconomies of Scale in R&D: Agency
Problems and the Allocation of Engineering Talent, Ideas, and Effort by Firm Size, 40 MGMT. SCI.
708,710-11 (1994).
36. See Edward P. Lazear, Pay Equality and Industrial Politics, 97 J. POL. ECON. 561, 562
(1989).
37. See Zenger, supra note 35, at 711-12.
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is explained by seniority, but with small highly positive and highly negative
rewards at the top and bottom of the distribution.38 Third, observability of
the output that triggers the incentive payoff dampens the incentive to engage
in core influence activity. Because the payoff is on an observable output
keyed to an external evaluation (the desirability of the innovation to venture
capitalists), the importance of the employees' knowledge to the decision-
maker is reduced and, it follows, so is the incentive to engage in influence
activities. Finally, the employer's determination that a particular innovation
warrants an entrepreneurial reward is more credible than a determination un-
der more subjective incentive plans because the employer commits not only
to making the award to the employee, but also to putting up its own capital to
fund development of the innovation. In effect, the employer signals to other
employees the credibility of its assessment of the winning employee's inno-
vation by putting its money behind its measurement.
Our analysis of the cost that offsets employer tax, information, and scope
advantages in a venture capital auction focuses on a different problem with
the incentive structure that is created by the employer's bidding. Even in the
absence of measurement problems with respect to the value of the innova-
tion, the employer may still confront measurement problems concerning the
ownership of the innovation-that is, determining the identity of the employ-
ees who are entitled to share in the entrepreneurial payoff of employer ven-
ture capital-like financing. Even in the absence of incentives for employees
to engage in influence activities with respect to whether an innovation war-
rants an entrepreneurial payoff, measurement problems still may give em-
ployees a significant incentive to engage in a special kind of influence activ-
ity with respect to who is entitled to receive the entrepreneurial payoff at all.
In particular, employees will have an incentive to engage in activities
that perfect an internal property right to the innovation that warrants the in-
centive payoff. In Part I, we motivated our analysis by assuming that the
employer cannot fully perfect its property right with respect to the engineer
vho wins the innovation lottery. The employer must still determine, how-
ever, which employees have retained the property right to an innovation, a
task that may be quite difficult where the research is a team, rather than an
individual, effort. The potential ex post ambiguity concerning ownership of
the internal property right to the innovation in turn creates an ex ante incen-
tive for employees to engage in a particular kind of influence activity whose
intensity is a function of the size of the entrepreneurial payoff. Because
these auction-induced activities may impose substantial ex ante costs on the
employer's entire research enterprise, they operate to restrict the employer's
ex post participation in the venture capital auction.
38. See Lazear, supra note 36, at 563-63.
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To see these relationships, assume that research and development is most
efficiently carried out in teams. Further assume that the activities of any sin-
gle team may create economies of scope when shared with members of other
teams pursuing related research. Finally, assume that the total entrepreneu-
rial reward to the employee with the internal property right to the innovation
is fixed: an increase in the number of employees holding the property right
reduces the per employee return. Under these not unreasonable assumptions,
employees will have a powerful incentive to perfect their internal property
rights by hoarding their information, both from actual and potential team
members and from other teams whose own research might benefit from ac-
cess to the first team's information. Such property-rights-perfecting activi-
ties have the capacity to be especially costly because not only do they divert
the employee's own efforts from productive activity but, more importantly,
they also reduce the productivity of many other employees who are part of
the employer's research and development activity by denying them access to
full team participation or to complementary information.3 9 Property-rights-
perfecting activity thus has a negative multiplier effect: It serves to reduce
the output of a wide range of research participants.
Two anecdotes from an academic research setting illustrate the problems
arising from the need to establish internal property rights in innovations. In
the early 1970s, Professor Piccione, a physicist at the University of Califor-
nia at San Diego, sued Emilio Segre and Owen Chamberlain for having sto-
len from him the idea that led to their receipt of the Nobel Prize in physics
for the discovery of the anti-proton. Segre and Chamberlain's decision about
how to allocate responsibility for their experimental research among partici-
pants in the effort (which included Piccione) served to allocate a property
right internal to the academy which came to have substantial value. The liti-
gation was resolved in favor of Segre and Chamberlain in an unreported
opinion of the California Court of Appeals for the First District (one of the
authors participated in Segre and Chamberlain's defense).
The same phenomenon also operates more generally and at lower aca-
demic stakes. By the mid-1980s, disputes over who should be listed as an
author, and in what order, on scholarly publications-the academic internal
property right-became quite serious. Academic success and future research
funding depended on the number of a researcher's publications and on the
39. Other work has noted the impact of incentives on teamwork and cooperative effort among
employees. Lazear argues that where cooperation among employees is important, we should see
less wage differential among employees, that is, we should see lower power incentives. See id. at
563. Holmstrom and Milgrom make a similar point: "[W]here individuals spend part of their ef-
forts on individual projects and part on team production, and assuming that individual contributions
to the team effort are difficult to assess, it would be dangerous to provide incentives for good per-
formance on the individual projects." Holmstrom & Milgrom, supra note 34, at 35. Our analysis
here differs in its emphasis on the employee's incentive to engage in property-rights-perfecting
activities.
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nature of the attribution. The problem became sufficiently controversial that
the president of Stanford University issued a report suggesting guidelines
governing research attribution. The perfecting of internal property rights to
innovations is a serious matter with respect to academic research. Commer-
cial research is likely to be just as internally divisive when the stakes are
high.4
It is important to note that the costs of property-rights-perfecting behav-
ior are not due entirely to employer-provided incentives or payoffs. Some
employees may engage in this form of behavior to perfect property rights to
sell to an external bidder-here, the venture capitalist. The reason why
property-perfecting behavior may nonetheless be viewed primarily as a mar-
ginal cost to an existing employer is discussed in Part H.
iIM. EMPLOYER'S BIDDING STRATEGY
To this point, our analysis has stressed a previously unemphasized factor
that helps explain start-ups: the costs to the employer's research and devel-
opment program associated -vith employee efforts to perfect internal property
rights induced by employer bidding.41 We have omitted any discussion of an
additional important and, in some sense obvious, explanation for start-ups:
Employees do not regard venture capital entrepreneurship as an identical
substitute for continued employment. Employees have different utility func-
40. Donald Kennedy, President Kennedy's Statement on Academic Authorship, in STANFORD
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK 28 (1989). Kennedy's report captures a sense of the
measurement problem:
There is a cluster of questions about authorship and intellectual "ownership" that includes
these, among others: What level of contribution by the various parties to a research enterprise
qualifies for (co)authorship of the product? What circumstances entitle one to independent or
first publication or to the use of data in another publication or project without attribution? In
considering these, I am struck by the seamlessness that often characterizes collaborative re-
search ....
[T]he original inspiration may defy reconstruction by the time the project is completed.
One member of an experimental team ... may provide an absolutely critical skill, without
which the entire venture could not proceed; one contributor to a scholarly project may have
had an idea that was essential to the working out of the problem .... The more interactive the
process, the less we can retrospectively divide the work into parts corresponding to particular
roles or contributions.
Id, at 30-3 1.
41. Naomi Lamoreaux and Kenneth Sokoloff report that employers like Western Electric rec-
ognized early in the 20th century that paying employees bonuses for inventions 'put a tremendous
incentive' on employees to work 'at counterpoints to their own associates,' creating a situation
where 'men would not work with each other... [though] the problem which was before us was a
problem which required team action."' Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Investors,
Firms and the Market for Technology in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries 52
(1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review) (citing Pooling of Patents:
Hearings on H.R. 4523 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong. 276 (1936) (testimony of
Dr. Frank Baldwin Jewett, Vice President of AT&T Co. and President of Bell Telephone Laborato-
ries)).
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tions and for that reason they differ in the value they place upon venture
capital funding. Employers take advantage of those differences in their bid-
ding strategy.
In what way do employees differ in their evaluation of an offer to join or
head a start-up? The most obvious example is risk aversion. The entrepre-
neurial return to employees on their innovations is risky: Empirical evidence
reports that approximately one-third of venture capital investments result in
losses, 42 some sixteen percent of venture capital backed companies are liqui-
dated or go bankrupt,43 and a significant percentage of would-be entrepre-
neurs never secure venture capital funding at all. Assume that employees
exhibit varying degrees of risk aversion, associated with their personal tastes
and circumstances. 44 For some employees, then, a less-intense-but-less-risky
internal incentive will be preferred to a more-intense-but-more-risky entre-
preneurial incentive offered by venture capitalists. Not only will the em-
ployee's risk aversion reduce the expected direct cost necessary for the em-
ployer to retain the employee and her innovation relative to what the venture
capitalist would have to pay, but the less-intense incentive also will reduce
the employee's corresponding incentive to engage in costly property-rights-
protecting activities.
Risk aversion, however, is not the only personal taste bearing on an em-
ployee's choice between remaining with the employer and pursuing her in-
novation through a venture capital-financed start-up. For example, an em-
ployee may positively value the opportunity to be her own boss, as well as
the favorable cultural image of an entrepreneur. 45 For these employees, the
employer's incentive would have to be more intense than that offered by the
venture capitalist in order to offset the imputed income associated with a
start-up.
Differences in employee characteristics interact in an interesting way
with property-rights-protecting costs. As noted above, such costs cannot be
avoided entirely by an employer: An employee who thinks she is likely to
receive a more desirable offer from a venture capitalist may engage in such
behavior even if she does not expect her current employer to bid.46 Assume
42. See Barry, supra note 8, at 3; Sahlman, supra note 5, at 483-84.
43. See Gompers, supra note 8, at 1472-73.
44. Holmstrom stresses the importance of risk aversion in setting the employee's contingent
compensation. See Holmstrom, supra note 34, at 310. Robert P. Merges argues that an employee's
ability to leave with her innovation free of a property right in her employer is greater the earlier in
the development process it occurs. The earlier in the process the employee must decide, however,
the riskier is the start-up option. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and Employee
Inventions 37 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
45. See SAXENIAN, supra note 1, at 38.
46. There is reason to believe, however, that property-rights-protecting costs will be lower
when the payoff is made by a venture capitalist, than when made by the employer through an inter-
nal incentive program. Recall that the potential for influence costs arises from an information
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that the ex ante incentives for such an employee are identical, with or with-
out the competing bid. Assume also that employees know in advance
whether they are likely to find venture capital funding particularly attractive.
If each employee's utility function is different but known to the employer,
internal-property-rights-perfecting behavior would not be a factor in the em-
ployer's bidding strategy. The employer would only bid, or set internal in-
centives at a level, to retain those employees who (because of relative lack of
risk aversion or desire to engage in entrepreneurial activity) would otherwise
leave. These employees would engage in property-rights-perfecting behavior
anyway. No marginal costs with respect to such behavior would be triggered
by the employer's bid. In fact, of course, employers cannot know, or can
only imperfectly know, how attractive a given employee finds the entrepre-
neurial world of start-ups. A uniform, internal payoff structure high enough
to retain all valuable employees and their innovations will reward even those
employees who would have stayed absent the payoff. Employees in this lat-
ter (risk averse) class now have an incentive to engage in property-protecting
behavior. Thus in setting the level of internal payoff, employers balance the
gains from retaining valuable employees and innovations with the costs in-
curred from paying employees who would not otherwise leave. These costs
include both the payoff amount and the ex ante incentives to engage in prop-
erty-rights-protecting behavior established for this class of employees. Em-
ployers will rarely find it worthwhile to set the payoff amount high enough to
retain all valuable employees. Many employers will find it desirable to set a
firm "no-bid" strategy with respect to those employees who the internal in-
centive system will not retain. Valued employees are allowed to leave, and
start-ups ensue.
CONCLUSION
In this article we have added to the factors explaining the existence of
start-ups by stressing the costs imposed by employee efforts to perfect inter-
nal property rights to innovation. We argued that where research is a team
effort with potential economies of scope, the impact of employee efforts to
perfect internal property rights to innovations on an employer's research and
development program will limit the extent to which an employer, through its
internal incentives for innovation, will bid against a venture capitalist in an
asymmetry between the employee and the employer: the employer cannot observe the employee's
allocation of effort, thereby allowing the employee to provide the employer self-servingly inaccu-
rate information concerning the employee's productivity. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
When the payoff is made by a venture capitalist, who shares in the reward is determined in large
part not by the venture capitalist, but by the employees themselves through their decision of who
will be part of the new venture. Because employees will be better able than the employer to directly
observe whose contribution to the new venture will be most productive, the potential for property-
rights-protecting activity is limited.
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auction for the right to participate in an employee's innovation. Because
property-rights-perfecting costs will be a positive function of the intensity of
the incentive, the employer will take into account the personal tastes of em-
ployees in crafting its internal incentive structure. Where the cost of in-
creased property-rights-perfecting activity associated with an increase in in-
centive necessary to retain an employee would exceed the benefit of retain-
ing the innovation, an employer will prefer that the employee pursue a ven-
ture capital-backed start-up. Thus, we will observe start-ups by departing
employees despite the significant tax, informational, and scope advantages of
an employer over a venture capital-backed start-up.
